[Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 04.2024, Jean-Marc Rickli, Federico Mantellassi]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This extensive report elaborates on the impact emerging technologies will have on the future of warfare. The authors demonstrate how new technological realities (Drones, AI, Cyberspace & Information War) will shape the character of war in the future and are already doing so in the Ukraine War. Yet they also note, that despite the emergence of seemingly ground-breaking innovations in (weaponised) technology, the quantity of legacy systems such as tanks and artillery as well as a significant number of well-trained troops remain crucial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Link (Click on \u00abRead Publication\u00bb): https:\/\/www.gcsp.ch\/publications\/war-ukraine-reality-check-emerging-technologies-and-future-warfare<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [RUSI Journal, 04.2024, Dominik Presl]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The War in Ukraine has shown that within a population, a shared willingness to defend the country can have decisive effects on the question if an aggressor’s plans succeed. To name an example, in the first days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian Forces failed to consolidate their position in the northwest of Kyiv at Antonov Airport in Hostomel, partially due to armed volunteers providing resistance even before the Armed Forces of Ukraine arrived.1<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n The article quotes the Finnish and Estonia Comprehensive Defence Strategies, which suggest that for citizens, \u00abawareness and understanding of a credible threat to their security, a belief in the capacity of their country to defend itself from this threat, and an understanding of what their role would be in this effort are among the key factors increasing the willingness of citizens to defend their country\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Link: https:\/\/rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/fostering-will-fight-has-be-natos-next-priority<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [Modern War Institute at West Point, 03.2024, Josh Bowen, Jon Bate]<\/p>\n\n\n\n A unit can be perfectly trained (Command), well-managed and have efficient processes (Management), yet its culture (Leadership) can still prevent the unit from achieving its missions. In other words: \u00abCulture eats strategy for breakfast\u00bb. A U.S. Army brigade attempted to answer the question how leaders can invest in unit culture in a way that increases performance. Therefore, they conducted an experiment in three steps. Firstly, 150 members of the brigade (from all levels of command) came together and defined unit culture and its different aspects. Secondly, they used a survey to systematically measure how those aspects are being perceived by members of the brigade. Thirdly, the brigade took action to cultivate unit culture, and prioritized aspects of culture where a unit received low scores. Early results of the experiment suggest, that through this culture development, the brigade increased in both cohesion within as well as in performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Link: https:\/\/mwi.westpoint.edu\/cohesion-performance-and-readiness-a-brigade-level-experiment-in-the-art-and-science-of-organizational-culture\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [Stratos, 03.2024, Herv\u00e9 Barras, Mario Schwarz, Marcel M\u00fchlethaler]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cet article montre l’impact de la culture juste sur le d\u00e9veloppement des comp\u00e9tences des pilotes de chasse. La culture juste est une pens\u00e9e qui se repose sur le traitement et l\u2019analyse des erreurs dans le but d\u2019am\u00e9liorer la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Il y a une logique d\u2019apprentissage et d\u2019am\u00e9lioration en continue. Cette pens\u00e9e est tr\u00e8s d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e dans le monde de l\u2019aviation militaire. Dans cette \u00e9tude exploratoire, quatre pilotes de chasse sont interrog\u00e9s sur leur mani\u00e8re d\u2019apprendre, leur rapport aux erreurs et les traces qu\u2019ils collectent. Les r\u00e9sultats montrent clairement chez ces pilotes leurs capacit\u00e9s r\u00e9flexives. Ils ont confiance dans la formation re\u00e7ue, mais aussi dans les produits issus de cette culture juste. De plus, ils d\u00e9veloppent une confiance dans le groupe des pairs. Ce travail d\u00e9montre clairement l\u2019impact de cette culture juste dans la capacit\u00e9 de ces pilotes \u00e0 se d\u00e9velopper tout au long de leur carri\u00e8re. Cependant, quelques apports de la pratique r\u00e9flexive pourraient \u00eatre ins\u00e9r\u00e9 dans la formation et la carri\u00e8re professionnel pour valoriser et partager le d\u00e9veloppement des comp\u00e9tences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Link: https:\/\/www.vtg.admin.ch\/de\/aktuell\/publikationen\/stratos.detail.publication.html\/vtg-internet\/de\/publications\/stratos\/stratos-artikel\/stratos_digital_78_Barras_et-al_Debriefing_def2.pdf.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [Modern War Institute at West Point, 03.2024, Randy Noorman]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The tactical crisis resulted out of the emergence of increased firepower paired with higher accuracy and range and describes the crisis on the tactical level, as the threat of enemy firepower posed a dilemma. On one hand, achieving a local breakthrough requires a concentration of forces, on the other hand, concentrating forces put them at great risk of enemy artillery. This dilemma was later overcome by higher mobility, and speed allowed combat troops to conduct offensive operations whilst avoiding indirect fire. The article also elaborates on the roots of \u00abAuftragstaktik\u00bb. In Ukraine, more advanced reconnaissance led to a nearly transparent battlefield. Paired with fast-targeting artillery and precise combat drones, this improved reconnaissance is translated into increased lethality of any movement (80% of the causalities in the Ukraine War are due to artillery2<\/a><\/sup>) and therefore favors positional, dug-in warfare, as opposed to warfare based on maneuver. The author of this article therefore argues that the tactical crisis of the 19th and 20th century has returned and states that \u00abbecause dispersion increases a commander\u2019s span of control, it reduces the ability to command and control the overall battle and in turn, raises the need for independent action of subordinate commanders\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Link: https:\/\/mwi.westpoint.edu\/the-return-of-the-tactical-crisis\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [RUSI Journal, 03.2024, Alex Vershinin]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The author remarks how in a potential great power conflict in the future, a strategy focused on attrition rather than on maneuver might prove decisive. He then elaborates on the implications of such a strategy. For one, a high capacity for force generation and replacements in both personnel and mat\u00e9riel would be required. Moreover, Vershinin remarks on how the force-centric approach required for wars of attrition tends to benefit armies which are officer-focused. This stands in contrast to most Western Armies, including the Swiss Armed Forces, with its attempt to train competent Non-Commissioned Officers (Unteroffiziere \/ sous-officiers). Having thoroughly trained NCOs allows for troops to conduct more complex operations. Nevertheless, in the case of an attritional war, replacing them with equally well-trained NCOs would take a considerable amount of time and further strain the resources of the Armed Forces. Despite it having other drawbacks, Armed Forces (such as in Russia) mostly rely on officers (Lieutenants) to lead their troops. Since it takes only a fraction of the number of lieutenants compared to NCOs and since in such armies, lieutenants tend to be further from the frontline than NCOs who are expected to lead their troops by example, fewer trained leaders are WIA or KIA, which makes it easier to replace losses or quickly expand forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Link: https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Le \u00ab Update Conduite \u00bb est une rubrique r\u00e9currente de la newsletter Leader’s Digest<\/a>. Cette newsletter est le fruit d’une coop\u00e9ration entre le Leadership Campus de l’Arm\u00e9e suisse<\/a> et les \u00e9tudes conduite et communication<\/a> de l’Acad\u00e9mie militaire \u00e0 l’EPF de Zurich. Si vous n’\u00eates pas encore abonn\u00e9 au Leader’s Digest, vous trouverez de plus amples informations ainsi que le formulaire d’inscription en cliquant sur ce lien<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Si vous d\u00e9couvrez des choses int\u00e9ressantes \u00e0 lire sur Command, Leadership ou Management, nous serions heureux que vous les partagiez avec nous. Nous serions heureux de recevoir des conseils pour le prochain num\u00e9ro du Leader’s Digest par Fostering a \u00abWill to Fight\u00bb Has to be NATO’s Next Priority<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Cohesion, Performance, and Readiness: A Brigade-Level Experiment in the Art and Science of Organizational Culture<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
La Culture Juste chez des Pilotes de Chasse, Cons\u00e9quences sur leurs Apprentissages<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Return of the Tactical Crisis<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\u00c0 propos de \u00ab Update Conduite \u00bb<\/h2>\n\n\n\n