Geistige Landesverteidigung als Teil der Gesamtverteidigung
[Defence Horizon Journal, 15.09.2025, Sarah von Felten & Jonas Ch. Frey]
Wörter wie «hybride Kriegsführung» und «Desinformation» sind zurzeit in aller Munde, und auf Antwort darauf ist oft von «Resilienz» die Rede. Sei es societal resilience, mental resilience, informational resilience oder supply chain resilience, die Kombinationen scheinen endlos. Eine Art umfassende Resilienz beschreibt auch der Begriff der Geistigen Landesverteidigung, welcher zurzeit entstaubt wird. Denn: ursprünglich als Schutz vor totalitären Ideologien gedacht, eignet sich Geistige Landesverteidigung auch heute noch als Antwort auf Desinformation und hybride Bedrohungen. Von Felten und Frey argumentieren, dass die Geistige Landesverteidigung trotz deren teilweisen Stigmatisierung in den Schweizer Institutionen weiterlebt. Der Beitrag entwickelt auf Basis eines österreichischen Referenzmodells ein Schweizer Funktionsmodell, das die sieben Bundesdepartemente und die Bundeskanzlei einbindet und die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in der Geistigen Landesverteidigung hervorhebt. Das Konzept der Geistigen Landesverteidigung sollte entstigmatisiert werden und wieder in die Mitte der Gesellschaft finden.
Link: https://tdhj.org/de/post/geistige-landesverteidigung-gesamtverteidigung/
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Military Decision-Making Process and Mission Command
[Defence Horizon Journal, 11.09.2025, Patrick Hofstetter et al.]
This article explores how artificial intelligence is reshaping military command, using John Boyd’s OODA Loop to analyse impacts across observation, orientation, decision, and action. AI can accelerate data processing, decision support, and execution, but also risks over-centralisation and automation bias. Written by Patrick Hofstetter, Marius Geller, and Florian Gerster, it argues that Western militaries should align AI with Mission Command’s decentralised philosophy, empowering subordinates while preserving accountability. The authors propose a continuum between centralisation and decentralisation, where doctrine, culture, and structures adapt flexibly according to the situation at hand.
Risiko- und Krisenmanagement und Armee
[Stratos 1-25, 04.07.2025, Schweizer Armee]
Stratos ist wieder da! Die im Juli erschienene Edition 1-25 beschäftigt sich mit dem Beitrag, welchen die Armee für das Risiko- und Krisenmanagement auf nationaler und kantonaler Ebene leistet, und den Voraussetzungen dafür, dass sie diesen Beitrag auch in Zukunft weiterhin erbringen kann. Insbesondere lesenswert sind die Artikel Cognitive Warfare: Die Schweizer Armee – Herausforderungen in der kognitiven Dimension (S. 135+) und Kämpfen – schützen (– helfen); gleichzeitig und im gleichen Raum (S. 167+).
Link: https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/stratos
NATO Should Not Replace Traditional Firepower with ‘Drones’
[RUSI, 04.08.2025, Prof. Justin Bronk]
The extent of the use of UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) in the Russian-Ukrainian War has led some commentators to announce that cheap UAS will complement or even replace expensive legacy systems in the future. In this article published by the British think tank RUSI, Justin Bronk argues that even as UAS see heavy use in the Russian-Ukrainian War, one must be careful not to draw the wrong conclusions. For one, the Ukrainian way of war is by no means ideal, as Ukraine’s capabilities are limited by financial and industrial limits. It is instead focused on utilising the available limited resources to the best extent possible. Secondly, NATO has different strength than Ukraine and should make sure to capitalise on its strengths. Overall it’s an interesting report which argues that NATO should complement yet not replace its legacy systems with UAS.
An AI Revolution in Military Affairs?
[RAND Corporation, 03.07.2025, Zachary Burdette et al.]
This report of the US-think tank RAND offers a comprehensive analysis of how AI will likely change warfare, and what this means for militaries. Their findings are relevant from the tactical level all the way up to the military-strategic level. In summary, the report suggest that as the capabilities of relatively cheap systems increase, mass may become more important relative to quality. This doesn’t suggest that high-end systems will become irrelevant, rather it means that to maximise the effectiveness of the armed forces, a part of military funding that currently funds high-end systems in low numbers will have to be re-allocated towards financing mass constituted by cheaper systems. The authors further suggest that in AI-enabled warfare mission command will stay relevant and that deception (i.e. through decoys) will gain importance. Download the full report on the link below.
Link: https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4004-1.html
Urban Warfare Project Case Study #13 ─ Hadrut
[Modern War Institute, 25.04.2025, Liam Collins & John Spencer]
In this case study, the authors look at the Second Karabakh/Artsakh War of September 2020, and investigate the reasons why in the battle for the provincial capital Hadrut the Armenian Armed Forces failed to put up an adequate defence, and why the Azerbaijani Armed Forces succeeded in taking the city. The war ended in a decisive Azerbaijani victory, with Azerbaijan (re-)integrating the internationally recognized Azerbaijani, yet Armenian-inhabited territory of Karabakh/Artsakh into Azerbaijan.
Link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-13-battle-of-hadrut/
More highly valuable case studies can be found here: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/
A Clausewitzian Lens on Modern Urban Warfare
[Modern War Institute, 13.05.2025, John Spencer]
In this article, the author takes the 2-century-old wisdom of Carl von Clausewitz and applies it to modern urban warfare in Iraq, Ukraine and Gaza. He closes this valuable read by pointing to the continued relevance of Clausewitzian concepts such as the nature of war, “a contest of wills, shaped by politics, distorted by chance, and fought in the dense, contested, and morally fraught terrain of the modern city”.
Link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/a-clausewitzian-lens-on-modern-urban-warfare/
The Dialectic of Deception: John Boyd and the Cognitive Battlefield
[War on the Rocks, 04.09.2025, J. William DeMarco]
This fascinating article applies John Boyd’s OODA-Loop (Observe – Orient – Decide – Act) theory to society. The paper argue that nowadays “the center of gravity is no longer fleets or factories but the shared grasp of reality itself”. A society where facts are seen as opinion and opinions are seen as facts will become unable to coordinate effective resistance against any threat, as it lacks a shared understanding of the threat and the common purpose to address it. Open societies where ideas can freely circulate are an especially worthwhile target, with Russia having perfected the method of using lies not for the sake of offering an alternative reality, but for damaging the very idea of truth itself.
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