About the Interviewee
Callsign Khodor served as a machine gunner in a separate sniper company of the 36th Marine Brigade. His main tasks included conducting counter-sniper operations, engaging enemy infantry, and providing support to adjacent units. Later, Khodor was assigned to an assault company within the same brigade. In this role, his main task was to assault enemy positions and hold captured ground. He was deployed to the Eastern front (Donetsk & Luhansk regions) and later deployed to the Southern front (Zaporizhzhia & Kherson regions) and served from 2022-2024. He was wounded in Zaporizhzhia region, which later led to his discharge from service. In July 2025 he lives a quiet life with his family, somewhere else in Ukraine.
How did your unit tactically adapt during the war?
At the beginning of the full-scale war, we mainly practiced sniper pair or trio tactics: a pair is a sniper and a spotter, a trio is a sniper, a spotter, and a machine gunner (which was my role). We constantly had to adapt to the terrain, which was mostly villages and tree lines, where combat is very different. Over time, drones appeared more frequently, completely changing the nature of the war. Camouflage became almost useless because drones have thermal and night vision cameras, making it hard to hide. Buildings we occupied were constantly monitored by drones, which complicated our tasks. Now, modern technologies—especially FPV and reconnaissance drones—have a huge impact, more so than infantry. For striking heavy equipment, we used drones capable of carrying significant payloads.
Also, never play dead under a drone—run to cover with all your strength. I survived once by running after playing dead, seconds before a grenade exploded where I had been lying.
What mistakes did you or your unit make during your deployment, and how did you correct them?
We constantly had logistical problems, especially accessing combat positions, which complicated infantry work. On one mission at night, we had to cross a dangerous area under enemy machine-gun fire. We moved in a column of about 10 people, fully loaded with ammunition and supplies. When we had to run 100 meters across the danger zone, a man in front of me tripped and fell. My mistake was helping him up instead of running ahead, but I helped, and four of us moved forward. Soon, we realised we were separated from the group in unfamiliar terrain with no communication devices except turned-off phones. I decided we should wait off the road rather than move forward or call (which could reveal our position). After about 20 minutes, a scout from our group found us and led us to safety. My decision was confirmed as correct: moving forward or calling would have led to death. Also, never play dead under a drone—run to cover with all your strength. I survived once by running after playing dead, seconds before a grenade exploded where I had been lying.
Has your perception of the battlefield changed over time? If so, how?
Over time, I got used to everything and instinctively knew how to act in any situation. I was constantly tense, and after a long time at the front, a sense of safety and deep fatigue set in.
In your experience, what are the most important qualities of a good officer or senior NCO?
Responsibility for personnel, an established evacuation point, reliable communication and reconnaissance, control of all personal equipment and medical kits, and monitoring the emotional state of the unit. These are essential qualities in my opinion.
How did you and your unit maintain morale during especially difficult or psychologically challenging periods?
To calm myself and the guys during tough times, I read Andrzej Sapkowski’s «The Witcher» on an e-reader, sang songs, and told jokes. I always thought about my family waiting for me and knew that units like mine were not taken prisoner but tortured and killed. I always had to be decisive.
Can you give an example where leadership determined success or failure?
Take my example from that mission at night. Also, when I joined another unit with many skills, I wanted to share them with new soldiers, but no one listened because of my low rank and their fatalistic attitudes.
How have drones changed your unit’s actions on the battlefield?
Drones provided us with a lot of information over the radio, warned us when enemy equipment approached, destroyed enemy vehicles and soldiers, and thus saved our lives.
What lessons have you learned about effective drone use—and about protection from enemy drones?
You must run; electronic warfare (EW) doesn’t always help. We have very few anti-drone rifles. Now, it’s a drone war, and infantry must be very lucky to survive a drone encounter.
Which commercial technologies (civilian drones, apps, radios, etc.) turned out to be surprisingly useful?
Homemade drones made by volunteers, homemade electronic warfare devices, and various munitions crafted by the guys to destroy fortifications, equipment, and soldiers.
What difficulties did you face in training or quickly implementing new technologies?
We mostly didn’t have these technologies, or only in very limited numbers. A young person can learn new technologies easily if he or she wants to.
How did you ensure communication in combat conditions, especially considering jamming or limited infrastructure?
Radios, or runners delivering information to positions. All information was encrypted and everyone had to know what to say; codes were changed constantly.
What were the biggest logistical challenges you faced, and how did you overcome them?
We overcame them with a cool head and a lot of luck.
How did you balance central command directives with decentralized decision-making?
The commander must decide, and whoever takes command must consider whether it’s worth it and what the consequences will be.
What do you consider the greatest strengths of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
Rapid adaptation, unbreakable spirit, maximum use of available opportunities, well-thought-out tactics, and devotion to family.
What vulnerabilities or structural problems have you observed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine that should be addressed?
Corruption, logistics, armaments, and the need to regulate service terms—which would motivate people to join. Salaries must be properly organised; the current system is terrible.
Which practices or habits of Ukrainian soldiers might be useful for other armed forces, such as Switzerland?
Tactics, combat skills, survival skills, adaptability, and stress resistance.
In which environments did you mostly operate, and what were your key takeaways from these different environments (e.g., forest, city, steppe, industrial zones)?
The city is the worst because there’s no visibility and assaults are extremely difficult—a skilled sapper means death in the city. Tree lines can be held for a long time by digging trenches and bunkers.
What most surprised you about your own psychological resilience or that of your comrades?
That I haven’t lost my mind, and did not become aggressive and easily irritable in civilian life, and that I try to live life even though after my injury the state left me without financial support for 8 months (only $15 per month), didn’t let me resign, and kept me in the field even though I was useless. My efforts to keep myself mentally sane were mostly self-directed. Apart from your comrades, no one will truly understand you.
Is there anything else you would like to share?
I wish everyone peaceful skies and wait for my comrades to return home alive.
Leader’s Digest thanks Khodor for the interview.
